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ABSTRACT

Administrators' perspectives on faculty bargaining are assessed, using data from a survey of administrators in the California State University and Colleges. The following are reported: (1) administrators' attitudes toward, and perceptions of, a variety of current conditions in their organizations; (2) their expectations as to the impact of collective bargaining; and (3) their assessment of the effectiveness of bargaining in higher education. These are then related to the degree of support for faculty bargaining in the CSUC, using bivariate analysis. Factor analysis is used to reduce the set of expectations with respect to the impact of bargaining to a set of underlying dimensions. Indices of these dimensions, together with attitudinal and perceptual variables, were then used as predictors of the degree of support for bargaining. The model explains 53 percent of the variance. (Author)

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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVES

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We now have many studies of faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining on campus. A few studies of top administrators have been reported [7, 11, 12], and some presidents have stated their own positions, e.g., [2]. The perspectives of middle-level administrators have been largely neglected. The objectives of this paper are: (1) to assess perspectives on faculty collective bargaining held by university administrators below the level of campus chief executive officer, employed in academic or academically related positions with managerial responsibilities; and (2) to seek to explain the extent of their support for the implementation of faculty bargaining in their own institutions.[1] Data for this paper were derived from responses to a survey of administrators in the California State University and Colleges (CSUC).[2]

Our respondents tend to oppose the implementation of collective bargaining in the CSUC: 60 percent are opposed or strongly opposed, while one-quarter are supportive, including 5 percent who are strongly supportive (table 1). As would be expected, almost three-fifths of our respondents would prefer that the faculty vote for "no agent" in a representation election (table 2). Support for UPC as bargaining agent is minimal. While 28.3 percent would prefer a faculty vote for CFA, only 8.5 percent endorse a vote for UPC. Given an opportunity to express a second-choice preference, those who prefer "no agent" as their first choice show a strong tendency to shift to CFA rather than to UPC.

TABLE 1

SUPPORT FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN THE CSUC

(N = 247)

	Percent
Strongly oppose	27.9
Oppose	32.0
Neutral	15.4
Favor	19.4
Strongly favor	5.3

TABLE 2

REPRESENTATION ELECTION OUTCOME PREFERENCES

(N = 247)

	First Choice (Percent)	Second Choice (Percent)
CFA	28.3	44.5
No collective bargaining	55.9	17.8
UPC	8.5	6.1
Uncertain	7.3	31.6

Significance of Administrative Perspectives

Perspectives of middle-level administrators are significant because of their implications for the institutionalization of faculty bargaining. They have a substantial impact on the collective-bargaining process, especially on contract administration. Thus, their attitudes and behavior will have an impact on the quality of relations and on how smoothly bargaining relations are established in a university.

In general, we would expect that the greater the aversion to collective bargaining, the more difficult it will be for administrators to adapt to bargaining relations. This difficulty would surely be exacerbated should the least-favored faculty organization be chosen as bargaining agent. We know from motivation theory that individuals tend to evaluate events in terms of their own expectations. Therefore, administrators' behavior under collective bargaining will be influenced by prior expectations. If administrators expect faculty bargaining to have deleterious consequences, they are likely to interpret changes as unfortunate. This would be especially true for those whose opposition to collective bargaining in their own institution is rooted in a generalized aversion to collective bargaining. For such administrators, subsequent experience that disconfirms pessimistic expectations as to particulars may have little effect on hostile attitudes.

There are policy implications here for strategies of top administrators. When formulating strategy for coping with a representation election campaign and for dealing with a bargaining agent, top administrators would benefit from knowing the extent to which their

administrative subordinates are likely to be supportive of a proposed or adopted strategy. Such knowledge should be a factor in deciding the extent to which middle-level administrators should be mobilized in an anti-bargaining campaign. An awareness of their concerns is a necessary step in developing programs to facilitate their adaptation to collective bargaining. Precise identification of specific concerns about the impact of bargaining should make it possible for middle-level administrators to be better prepared to deal with these concerns and the implementation of collective bargaining. For example, such precise knowledge would provide a useful basis for developing training programs [9].

Perspectives on collective bargaining may have implications for turnover of middle-level administrators, should faculty bargaining be implemented. Those who are hostile may prefer not to retain their positions. Top administrators may conclude that such subordinates may not be able to adapt well and should therefore not be retained. Similarly, top administrators who wish to implement a tough strategy in relations with a faculty union may prefer not to retain middle-level administrators who favor collective bargaining as benefiting the faculty.

The Institutional Context

We would expect our findings to be influenced by the institutional context of the present study. Conditions and developments in the CSUC have been analyzed in detail elsewhere [4, 15], and we cover here only

those that are particularly salient to our central themes. Following World War II, the state colleges in California experienced rapid growth, changes in mission, and broad-ranging shifts in functions--changes often asserted to be associated with internal strains and discontent [1, 3, 8]. Rapid growth, large size, and associated resource-allocation issues led to the establishment in 1961 of a central administration, headed by a chancellor under a board of trustees, with system-management responsibilities. The CSUC system is now very large: 19 main campuses, about 11,000 full-time faculty, and almost 300,000 students.

Organizational structure, including the administrative structure, is very complex: an elongated hierarchy runs from the board through multiple vertical levels, while lateral relations are highly differentiated. Policies and procedures, with respect to a multiplicity of issues, are highly elaborate. Administration-faculty relations are also complex. Substantial faculty participation in decision making exists, including significant elements of collegialism at the departmental level, elaborate campus committee structures, campus senates, a systemwide senate, and "meet and confer" rights exercised by faculty organizations.[3] Although faculty participation is not new, there has been continuing conflict at the systemwide level and on many campuses over the appropriate distribution of authority. In addition, conflict has occurred over a succession of specific issues in areas of educational policy, employee welfare, personnel procedures, grievance procedures, and resource allocation.

CSUC personnel must function within a variety of constraints that derive from outside the system. There has long been considerable state political involvement in the system through participation of elected state officials on the board, imposition of detailed budgetary allocations, auditing of expenditures, and periodic legislative and state executive investigations of a variety of aspects of internal operations. The CSUC is a lower-tier system that has been disadvantaged in relation to the University of California, in terms of mission and programs, academic preparation of students, budgetary allocations, conditions of employment, and prestige. The reduced CSUC growth rate in the 1970s has potentially serious implications for resource allocation, accountability requirements, and conditions of employment. The implications of "steady state" conditions are of major concern within the CSUC, and there is considerable uncertainty as to what the precise implications will be.

A succession of polls and surveys conducted over the past decade has shown the existence of considerable faculty dissatisfaction, with respect to particular issues and the distribution of authority [4, 15, 16]. Collective bargaining has been a major issue in the system since an intensive AFT organizing drive in 1965-66. It has been endorsed by all but the smallest of the faculty organizations and by the systemwide senate. A survey by James O. Haehn, conducted in 1969, revealed majority faculty support for collective bargaining [4], a condition which persists [16]. Decision making within the system has been complicated by the faculty organizations' drive for collective bargaining and by conflict among those organizations. This conflict has maintained the

saliency of the collective-bargaining issue within the CSUC, despite the continuing failure to secure legislation that would permit its implementation.

CSUC administrators, then, are located in a complex network of relations and are subject to constraints from a variety of sources. They work among faculty members who are supportive of collective bargaining. The issue has been salient among administrators for more than a decade. Trustees and top administrators have frequently expressed opposition to collective bargaining. Administrators have had the opportunity to monitor the implementation of collective bargaining elsewhere in higher education over several years. Given this complex institutional context, we are able to assess the impact of a variety of factors on administrators' support for, or opposition to, faculty bargaining.

Conceptual Framework

Our initial conceptual framework is derived from the literature on university governance and from organization theory. We posited that the degree of support for collective bargaining would be related to:

1) the level of satisfaction with one's administrative role and the expected impact of collective bargaining on that role;
2) the extent of empathy with faculty and expectations that bargaining will improve conditions for faculty;
3) attitudes toward existing forms of administration-faculty relations and expected changes in these relations under collective bargaining;

4) perceptions of institutional characteristics (degree of autonomy, resources, and quality) and expected impact of bargaining on these; and

5) social role factors, including type of administrative position, career orientation, and political beliefs.

We further posited that degree of support for collective bargaining would be influenced by the extent of knowledge about collective bargaining and by assessment of that knowledge. In organization theoretic terms, we are assuming a model of rational choice, according to which administrators form preferences as a result of assessing (1) their attitudes toward, and perceptions of, existing conditions; (2) their expectations as to changes that would result under collective bargaining; and (3) their knowledge about collective bargaining.

We derive our sets of variables from: (1) reported attitudes and expectations of top administrators, (2) an argument that forms a rationale for administrators' support of collective bargaining, (3) an argument that forms a rationale for administrators' opposition to bargaining, and (4) factors that have been shown to be associated with faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining. After providing the theoretical justification for our sets of variables, we then (1) report findings, with respect to attitudes, perceptions, or expectations; and (2) show the extent to which the included variables are associated with attitudes to the implementation of faculty bargaining in the CSUC, using simple correlations. The relevant data are reported in table 3.

Perspectives of Top Administrators

Top administrators, including those in the CSUC, tend to oppose faculty bargaining in general and its implementation on their own campuses in particular [2, 7, 11, 12, 15]. Such opposition is not surprising. Top management groups in all kinds of organizations have opposed collective bargaining as a process which inhibits organizational efficiency and effectiveness, while doing little for the well-being of employees. Campus chief executives view faculty bargaining as divisive: administrative-faculty relations become adversarial, conflict increases, and desirable "shared-authority" governance processes are undermined. Chief executives also tend to view collective bargaining as leading to a shift of power to the unionized faculty, thus exacerbating the already complex political pressures bearing on administrators and further constraining administrative decision making. The latter is also seen to be restricted by a tendency for bargaining to lead to a shift of power to systemwide levels and to external forces. This tendency is viewed as leading to an undesirable weakening of campus autonomy. Finally, chief executives see collective bargaining as adversely affecting organizational effectiveness, lowering faculty performance, and inhibiting administrative ability to act for the good of the institution.

Rationale for Administrator Support for Faculty Bargaining

It is possible to derive, on conceptual grounds, a rationale for either administrator support for, or opposition to, the implementation of faculty bargaining. The essence of the argument that administrators

may derive advantages from faculty bargaining is that certain aspects of collective bargaining practice enhance the efficiency of university governance. Collective bargaining simplifies the process of reaching agreements on campus; systematic procedures replace the morass of existing relationships. Collective bargaining structures induce greater realism on the part of faculty representatives. Decision-making processes are rationalized, and conflict is easier to manage. Issues get resolved and remain so for the duration of the agreement. Resolution of issues and stability of relations help to clarify areas of managerial authority and to facilitate the exercise of managerial initiative freed from the continuing challenges inherent in a shared-authority governance system. Since employee responsibilities are more clearly defined, their behavior can be more easily influenced. Efficiency within the administration of the university is enhanced: administrators become "better managers," certain kinds of experts (lawyers, financial specialists) are more effectively utilized, and information systems underlying administrative decisions are improved. The role of management in the university is strengthened. This position has been stated by Naples [11] and others [14].

Rationale for Administrator Opposition to Faculty Bargaining

A rationale for administrator opposition to faculty bargaining can be derived from arguments developed by Kemerer and Baldridge [7]. They suggest, largely on the basis of case studies of seven institutions, that faculty bargaining generates a number of costs for

middle-management administrators. They have little influence over the bargaining process, yet negotiated agreements adversely affect their own salaries, professional roles, and managerial responsibilities.

Structural effects of collective bargaining can have adverse consequences for administrators' role behavior. Because top managers seek to control the process and to assure uniformity of behavior among lower managers in their relations with the union, collective bargaining tends to lead to managerial centralization. Centralization reduces the scope of decision making on the part of middle-level administrators. Contractual provisions and the operation of the grievance procedure also tend to reduce administrators' flexibility in decision making.

Kemerer and Baldridge suggest that as collective bargaining processes come to dominate governance, power within the administrative ranks also tends to shift from "traditional faculty-related administrators" to those whose expertise is more central to those processes, such as lawyers, budget analysts, and information system specialists [7, p. 10]. As their task performance is complicated, middle-level administrators "are likely to feel that bargaining goes on at their expense" [7, p. 10]. Their sense of integration within the administrative hierarchy is weakened. They perceive a lack of support from top administration, their identification with top administration becomes tenuous, and their commitment to effective decision making becomes attenuated. Middle-management administrators also experience costs of increasing antagonism and conflict in their relations with the faculty. They feel isolated, frustrated, and insecure.

Prebargaining Conditions

The preceding arguments relate primarily to expectations as to outcomes, should collective bargaining be implemented. Yet such expectations are developed within a context of current, prebargaining conditions within a particular institutional context. We have therefore developed a parallel set of variables to enable us to assess administrators' perceptions of, and attitudes toward, present conditions. It is to these that we turn first in analyzing our findings.

Empirical Findings

Prebargaining Conditions

We may first note that CSUC administrators, despite the complexity of their environment, the constraints upon them, and the dissatisfaction of CSUC faculty, are not a generally dissatisfied group. Three-quarters of our respondents express satisfaction with their job on our overall job-satisfaction measure (mean = 2.2 on a five-point scale). Only five are "very dissatisfied." Attitudes toward dimensions of one's administrative role are mixed. There is a strong sense of integration within the campus administrative hierarchy: our respondents show a strong tendency to be satisfied with their ability to influence decisions within the hierarchy, to view higher-level campus administrators as supportive, and to feel that they have access to adequate information in making decisions (table 3). This sense of integration does not extend beyond the campus: 62 percent view the systemwide administration

as unduly restricting campus autonomy. Administrators also feel inhibited by the complexity of rules and regulations and, to an even greater extent, to feel that the pressures of immediate problems inhibit proper attention to more basic, long-run problems. More of our respondents are satisfied with administrators' salaries than are dissatisfied. Of these role variables, only perceived integration within the hierarchy and satisfaction with salary are significantly associated with attitude toward the implementation of collective bargaining.

It has often been argued that administrators and faculty share a fundamental identity of interests [2, 6, 14]. This position implies that administrators who believe that the present governance system is unresponsive to faculty needs may view collective bargaining as desirable because it will help to improve conditions for the faculty. The majority of our respondents view the present governance system as responsive to faculty: campus senates are viewed as effective in influencing policy in directions preferred by faculty members, faculty personnel decisions are equitable, and faculty problems are solvable without collective bargaining. Except for the senate variable, these perceptions are strongly related to attitude toward the implementation of faculty bargaining.

We can expect attitudes toward existing forms of administration-faculty relations to be associated with level of support for collective bargaining. The rationale for this position is the frequently stated argument that a shared-authority governance system is *the* desirable form for a university: it incorporates cooperative relations and a

satisfactory distribution of authority and facilitates reaching broad agreement on decisions with respect to major issues (i.e., relations are efficient). To the extent that administrators believe that these conditions exist in their institutions, they would be more committed to the existing governance system and more strongly opposed to the implementation of collective bargaining. Our respondents are generally satisfied with the distribution of authority between administrators and faculty, and they view administration-faculty relations at the campus level as cooperative rather than conflictual. However, they view the systemwide administration as inadequately responsive to the faculty and believe that the complexity of relationships in the system inhibits reaching agreement on issues. There is a moderately significant tendency for such perceptions to be associated with support for bargaining.

There is a strong tendency for administrators to perceive that the state government exercises too much control over CSUC operations and provides inadequate resources to support the CSUC. Despite these feelings, our respondents tend to believe that the CSUC is effective in providing a good education to students. These perceptions are not significantly associated with attitudes toward the implementation of collective bargaining.

Expectations As to Outcomes Under Collective Bargaining

Turning to expectations, with respect to the impact of collective bargaining, we examine first expected consequences for one's own administrative role. Administrators take a dim view of the prospects. There

are strong tendencies to expect collective bargaining to lead to centralization on campus and from the campus level to the systemwide administration. Our respondents also anticipate greater restrictions on their own ability to make decisions. A large majority of the administrators expect a shift of decision-making power within administration away from academic to nonacademic administrators (lawyers, labor experts, and budget specialists). Each of these expectations is moderately or strongly related to opposition to collective bargaining.

Few of our administrators expect the faculty to derive direct benefits from collective bargaining. They expect the role of the senates to be weakened. They do not expect that faculty to be treated more equitably, an expectation that is strongly related to attitudes to collective bargaining.

Our respondents expect collective bargaining to lead to a deterioration of administration-faculty relations. They anticipate higher levels of conflict in administration-faculty relations (especially if UPC is elected as bargaining agent), combined with the adoption of a tougher stance by administrators in their relations with faculty. They do not anticipate that issues will be easier to resolve through faculty leaders becoming more realistic and practical under the constraints of collective bargaining processes. At the same time, administrators expect a weakening of the administration as collective bargaining enables the faculty to gain power at its expense. Each of these expectations is moderately to strongly related to attitudes to collective bargaining.

We find strong expectations of direct adverse effects on the CSUC as an organization, resulting from the implementation of collective bargaining. Administrators expect collective bargaining to lead to greater pressures on the CSUC from outside forces. Intervention in CSUC affairs by state government forces, already perceived as too great, is expected to increase. Outside union or association leaders are also expected to exercise increased influence over CSUC affairs, especially if UPC becomes the bargaining agent. Administrators do not anticipate that collective bargaining will lead to the exercise of any greater influence by the CSUC on environmental forces such as would lead to improvements in the level of resources provided by the state. At the same time, collective bargaining is viewed as leading to a reduction of the level of organizational effectiveness: lowered standards of faculty performance (especially under UPC) and poorer educational programs. Each of these expectations is quite strongly associated with attitudes toward the implementation of collective bargaining.

Expectations: Alternative Bargaining Agents

Our data permit us to differentiate between expectations according to whether UPC or CFA is elected as faculty bargaining agent. Some outcomes of collective bargaining are expected to result whichever faculty organization is chosen as bargaining agent for the faculty. Apparently they are regarded as inherent in the practice of collective bargaining (at least, given the CSUC context). However, expectations with respect to other potential outcomes vary according to which of the

rival faculty organizations is assumed to become the bargaining agent. As is reflected in the clear preference for CFA over UPC (table 2), CSUC administrators tend to be more pessimistic about the prospects for change should UPC bargain for the faculty.

Taking our first set of variables, a majority of our administrators expect both UPC- and CFA-style bargaining to lead to increased centralization on and beyond the campus, shifts of power to nonacademic administrators, and reduced flexibility in decision making for themselves as administrators. However, each of these expectational tendencies is considerably stronger for UPC than for CFA, especially the latter two outcomes. Fewer than one-quarter of our respondents expect either CFA or UPC bargaining to produce greater equity in decisions affecting faculty. Both are expected to lead to a weakening of senates as faculty representation structures, an expectation that is particularly pronounced with respect to UPC (74.7 percent versus 54 percent).

Turning to expectations with respect to impact on administration-faculty relations, both CFA and UPC bargaining is expected to increase faculty power by slightly fewer than half of our respondents. There is little confidence that either will lead to greater realism and practicality by faculty leaders. However, UPC bargaining is viewed as potentially far more destructive of relations than CFA bargaining: more than four-fifths expect increased conflict under UPC, while only one-third expect such an outcome under CFA bargaining; and while about half of our respondents expect a tough administrative stance in face of the CFA, 70 percent expect such a development should UPC be the faculty agent.

Few administrators believe that either CFA or UPC bargaining will result in an increase in the capacity of the CSUC system to secure resources from the state government. Similarly, few expect anything but unfortunate consequences for the quality of educational programs in either case. With respect to other direct effects on the CSUC as an organization, UPC bargaining is expected to be far more destructive. Thus, a majority of our respondents expect UPC bargaining to result in lower standards of faculty performance, while only one-third expect such a development with CFA. Such a pattern of expectations would appear to be consistent with a view of UPC as a more egalitarian organization than CFA. Further, institutional autonomy is expected to suffer much more should UPC become the bargaining agent. While fewer than half of our respondents expect CFA bargaining to lead to increased intervention into CSUC affairs by outside association leaders, only 5 percent expect the influence of outside union leaders not to increase should UPC be the bargaining agent. UPC bargaining is also seen as much more likely to lead to an undesirable increase in state government intervention than under CFA (66 percent versus about half of our respondents).

These findings would indicate that CSUC administrators are not convinced of the accuracy of the view that structures and processes inherent in collective bargaining, together with the dynamics of interorganizational rivalries, induce behavioral convergence of historically differentiated faculty organizations [7, 8]. If the convergence thesis is correct, then our data would indicate that administrators are likely to discover this only through actual experience with collective

bargaining. Given the pattern of differential expectations grounded in prebargaining experience and interpretations of bargaining experience elsewhere in higher education, we would predict that this learning process would not be quick or easy. Indeed, a self-fulfilling prophecy might be at work, so that behavior is grounded in preconceptions as to what will happen, with that behavior then confirming expectations. For example, administrators, who expect a tougher administrator stance should UPC become the bargaining agent, may be more likely to engage in obdurate behavior in dealing with UPC.

The differential patterns of expectations would lead us to anticipate that the institutionalization of collective bargaining at middle-management levels may be a rockier process should UPC be the bargaining agent. An alternative possibility is that election of the more militant faculty organization would lead to considerable turnover among administrators. This is a phenomenon which warrants some research across higher education as a whole.

Impact of Uncertainty with Respect to Outcomes

Knowledge of collective bargaining should be regarded as an important factor with respect to (1) administrators' preparation for the implementation of collective bargaining, and (2) the institutionalization of the practice of bargaining. As indicated earlier, the issue has been present and salient in the CSUC for more than a decade. A number of measures have been taken by the systemwide administration to raise the level of knowledge of bargaining practice on the part of campus

administrators. Our data show that there is considerable uncertainty among administrators as to what can be expected to happen under collective bargaining. The uncertainty level, with respect to particular outcomes, varies from 12.3 percent to 49.6 percent. We constructed composite uncertainty measures for both UPC and CFA expected outcomes. There is considerably greater reported uncertainty with respect to expected outcomes under CFA than under UPC. Such a finding indicates that CSUC administrators have formulated much firmer, more coherent images of UPC and of the union's potential impact under collective bargaining than is the case for CFA. However, our bivariate analysis reveals only a very weak correlation between both the CFA and the UPC composite uncertainty measures, and level of support for the implementation of collective bargaining (.06 in each case).

Perceptions of the Impact of Bargaining Elsewhere

Only five of our respondents believe that collective bargaining is working well in higher education, while two-thirds believe that it is not. One would expect that interpretation of experience elsewhere would strongly influence views as to its desirability in one's own institution. This is reflected in a very strong simple correlation (-.52). Given this interpretation of experience elsewhere, it is not surprising that administrators, seeing widespread faculty support for faculty bargaining, believe that faculty members do not understand its implications in the CSUC.

Political Orientation

Finally, we have included a political-orientation variable. Our rationale for including this variable derives from (1) a general tendency for political orientation to influence attitudes toward intraorganizational phenomena, and (2) its significance in explaining faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining [16]. We find a moderately strong tendency for left-oriented political orientations to be associated with administrators' support for faculty bargaining.

Underlying Dimensions of Expectations

The preceding analysis leaves a number of issues unresolved. We have not assessed the relative explanatory power of the variables considered. Such assessment requires multivariate analysis. Before conducting such analysis, some prior issues need to be resolved. We have discussed the various administrator expectations with respect to the impact of faculty bargaining as sets of particular items, without considering the underlying perceptual structure for which these expectations are indicators. Therefore, we remain uncertain about the following issues:

1) Do these expectations all derive from a single perceptual dimension, or are there a variety of independent dimensions?
2) For a given item, are administrator expectations concerning the UPC and the CFA correlated (either positively or negatively), or are they relatively independent?
3) Given a multidimensional perceptual space, how might these underlying dimensions be defined?

We have addressed these issues by doing factor analysis on the set of expectation items. Using generally accepted approaches to factor analysis, we found nine substantively meaningful, independent dimensions within the set of thirty expectations. These nine factors account for 70 percent of the total variance of the set of expectations. The factor loadings are given in table 4.

The first question posed above is equivalent to inquiring as to the existence of a general factor on which all items load heavily and which accounts for a substantial portion of the total variance. An examination of the initial (unrotated) factor solution indicated that the first factor accounted for only 27 percent of the total variance. This suggests considerable independence among the expectation items and the presence of a multidimensional perceptual framework, so that one can say that administrators differentiate among various potential outcomes of collective bargaining.

The second question posed above is dealt with by examining the pattern of factor loadings in order to discern the extent to which administrators differentiate between the expected UPC and CFA impact under collective bargaining. For any given expectation item, three distinct processes are possible:

a) Administrators *do not* expect the UPC and CFA to have differing impacts, which would be indicated by UPC and CFA expectation loading on the *same factor* and with the *same sign*.

b) Administrators expect the UPC and CFA to have *opposite*

impacts, which would be indicated by UPC and CFA expectations loading on the *same factor* but with the *opposite sign*.

c) Administrators evaluate the UPC and CFA independently of one another, which would be indicated by UPC and CFA expectations loading on *different* (orthogonal) *factors*.

In our analysis, we find both situations (a) and (c), but not situation (b).

Of the nine factors (table 4), seven reflect the situation described in (a). With respect to the items loading on these factors, administrators would appear to have undifferentiated expectations concerning the impact of the CFA and the UPC. These factors are:

Factor I: Collegiality (extent to which collective bargaining under UPC and CFA is expected to lead to a decrease in the influence of the faculty senate and increased intervention in CSUC affairs by the state government).

Factor III: Treatment of faculty (extent to which collective bargaining is expected to improve equity of personnel decisions and not reduce quality of faculty).

Factor V: Campus centralization (degree to which collective bargaining is expected to lead to a centralization of decision making on campus).

Factor VI: Administrator flexibility (extent to which collective bargaining is expected to reduce administrator flexibility).

Factor VII: Faculty power (extent to which collective bargaining is expected to increase faculty power vis-à-vis administrators).

Factor VIII: Pragmatism (extent to which faculty union leaders are expected to be "realistic" and practical in bargaining and contract administration).

Factor IX: Resources (extent to which collective bargaining is expected to increase level of resources provided the CSUC by the state government).

The remaining two factors reflect situation (c). Both are largely defined by the same expectation items but are differentiated in that Factor II is UPC-specific, while Factor IV is CFA-specific. These factors are defined by expectations that collective bargaining under the UPC *or* CFA will lead to a tougher stance by administrators in relations with faculty, increased intervention in CSUC affairs by outside union or association leaders, increased influence in the administration of CSUC by nonacademic administrators, reduced quality of educational programs, and increased conflict in the CSUC. Except for the quality-of-educational-programs item, these factors tend to reflect the administrator's expectations as to the *context* in which bargaining will take place, as opposed to substantive bargaining-induced organizational changes. We have therefore chosen to call Factor II "UPC bargaining context" and Factor IV "CFA bargaining context."

In summary, factor analysis of the expectation items indicated that, with respect to expected bargaining outcomes (changes in resource

allocation, decision-making processes, treatment of faculty, faculty influence, and organizational flexibility), administrators show perceptual acuity with respect to differentiating among outcomes, but *do not* differentiate between the impact of the CFA and the impact of the UPC. However, with respect to the expected *bargaining environment or context*, administrators tend to evaluate the UPC and CFA independently. We would further note that administrators do not differentiate between CFA and UPC with respect to expected organizational pragmatism (Factor VIII), although there is some perceived relationship between bargaining context and expected changes in institutional prestige or quality.

The differentiation with respect to bargaining-context items derives in part from the militant image of the UPC versus the moderate image of the CFA. Yet from the perspective of the administrator, this difference is largely illusory and has few implications for the relative ability of the organization to increase faculty power (Factor VII) or change the organization.

Multivariate Analysis

Previous sections dealt with an examination of the bivariate relationships between administrator support for the implementation of collective bargaining in the CSUC and a variety of hypothesized causal antecedents of that support. These independent variables may be grouped into the following categories: (a) perceptions of the CSUC (own role, faculty welfare, faculty-administration relations); (b) expected impact of collective bargaining (nine composite indices derived from factor analysis,

as described in the previous section); (c) political orientation; and (d) perceptions concerning collective bargaining in general in higher education and perceived faculty understanding of bargaining. In this section, we regress support for bargaining against all of these variables to discern which ones have the greatest direct effects on support for bargaining.

Our paper is largely exploratory in nature and, although concerned with identifying the causes of administrator support for bargaining, we do not consider causal relationships among the set of antecedent variables. Elaboration and a more detailed specification of our model, together with estimation of the appropriate path coefficients, will be undertaken as a next step in our research.

We have then reduced our initial list of perceptions of the CSUC (category (a)) to those items which show statistically significant simple correlations with support for bargaining. We use a stepwise inclusion technique to evaluate the relative explanatory power of the various categories of causal variables (table 5). Variables have been included in order of causal precedence. We have first included those we consider to be least likely to have direct effects on support for bargaining (perception of the CSUC) and then included those variables bearing a more immediate relationship to bargaining (categories (b), (c), and (d), above).

The first equation in table 5 includes only system-perception variables. These variables explain 21 percent of the variance in support

for bargaining. Only three of the perception variables have statistically significant direct effects. These are: integration into the organizational hierarchy ($p = -.21$), administrative responsiveness to faculty needs ($p = -.26$), and quality of personnel decisions ($p = -.25$). These are all of the expected sign.

These items were included first, since they form the perceptual backdrop against which attitudes and perceptions concerning bargaining emerge. Although these variables may exert direct effects on faculty expectations concerning bargaining, it is not clear whether they exert direct causal effects on attitude toward bargaining, per se. Inclusion of the more immediate items should partial out any indirect effects of these perceptual items.

When we include the expectations factors, political orientation, and general perceptions of collective bargaining into our equation (table 5, equation (2)), we find that the overall explanatory power is greatly increased ($R^2 = .56$), but the coefficients of the system-perceptions items are lowered and all become statistically insignificant, while political orientation, general perceptions of bargaining, and all but two of the expectations factors are significant. Although the change in the levels of significance of the system-perceptions variables could have resulted from multicollinearity effects, we found that the system-perceptions items are largely independent of expectations, political orientation, and general perceptions of collective bargaining. We therefore conclude that the relationship between system-perception variables and support for bargaining is not a direct effect;

rather, it is an indirect effect that is attributable to the intercorrelations between the system-perceptions variables and the other variables in the equation.

Given this conclusion, we view support for bargaining as almost exclusively a function of expectations concerning the impact of bargaining, political orientation, and general perceptions about collective bargaining in higher education (table 5, equation (3)). Such a model explains 53 percent of the variance in support for bargaining.

We find that administrators are prone to oppose collective bargaining if they perceive a lack of full understanding of the implications of bargaining on the part of the CSUC faculty ($p = .11$). This is apt to result from an apprehension that the implementation of bargaining will generate uncertainty, confusion, and conflict within the organization, as well as the possibility that faculty will misuse bargaining because of a failure to understand it (i.e., abuse of grievance machinery, excessive bargaining demands, factionalism within the union, etc.). However, administrators put far greater weight on their perceptions concerning how well bargaining is working in higher education in general ($p = .23$), which suggests that an expressed confidence in collective bargaining per se may more than compensate for those apprehensions. If such a confidence exists for an administrator, he may see the initial rough going attributable to faculty inexperience with and misunderstanding of bargaining as a short-lived phenomenon. Hence, he will be prone to support bargaining, other things being equal. Conversely, if he both perceives

faculty as not understanding bargaining and sees little likelihood of the system smoothing itself out in the long run, then he will be prone to oppose bargaining--again, other things being equal. Finally, if the administrator distrusts bargaining in general, but feels that faculty in the CSUC understand its implications, he still will be more prone to oppose bargaining, due to the greater weight attached to his general perception of bargaining in higher education.

Related to these perceptions are expectations concerning bargaining context and pragmatism on the part of union leaders in dealing with administrators. The greater the degree of pragmatism (Factor VIII) that administrators expect union leaders to bring to the bargaining table, the greater will be their support for bargaining ($p = .11$).

Both UPC context (Factor II) and CFA context (Factor IV) are strongly and negatively related to support for bargaining ($p = -.18$ and $p = -.14$, respectively), indicating that administrators will be quite prone to oppose bargaining if they see it as threatening to a climate of professionalism (as a result of increased conflict, a reduction in the quality of faculty, and a general polarization of administrators and faculty). UPC context is weighted somewhat more heavily than CFA context. This may be due to the greater range of values that expectations concerning the more militant UPC may assume. In the case of the CFA, the expected context may range from one of strong union-administration cooperation to one of moderate levels of conflict. In the case of the UPC, the expected context may range from one of cooperation to one of very high levels of conflict and considerable threat to institutional autonomy.

The implications of collective bargaining for the governance system appear to be important only to the extent that administrators expect their personal involvement and discretion in decision making to be challenged (Factor VI, p = -.11). Neither the expectation that bargaining will erode the influence of the faculty senate nor that it will lead to centralization of decision making to the campuswide level is significantly associated with support for bargaining (Factors I and V).

Administrators are more favorably inclined to support bargaining the more they expect it to lead to increased resources for the system as a whole (Factor IX, p = .15) and improvements in faculty welfare (Factor III, p = .23). Although these relationships are as expected, a somewhat surprising finding is that administrators are more supportive of collective bargaining the *more* they expect it to *increase* faculty power (Factor VII, p = .12). These three findings, taken together, seem to suggest that administrators in the middle and lower levels may well see a positive relationship between improvements in the welfare and influence of faculty and their own interests. Our data show that only about 30 percent of the administrators see themselves as socially closer to top administrators than to faculty members. Therefore, having controlled for the expectations concerning the deleterious effects of bargaining (i.e., bargaining context and personal discretion), administrators may support bargaining because of the expected carry-over effects (i.e., if faculty obtain increased salaries as a result of their bargaining power, then it is quite likely that those increases would be passed along to other CSUC employees).

Finally, and as expected, we found a very strong negative relationship between political conservatism and support for bargaining ($p = -.19$). While political conservatism is correlated with many of the other variables in the equation (and the association may well be causal), this result suggests that external political ideology may impact strongly on intraorganizational behavior, particularly when the issue transcends the organizational boundary. Political orientation may also be a proxy for status and length of involvement in and commitment to the organization. In a parallel study, we have discerned that the political ideology of *faculty* impacts strongly on participation in unions and support for bargaining *after* controlling for status/role variables [16]. Hence, we conclude that political ideology bears a strong, direct relationship here, although we have not explicitly controlled for status/role variables.

Implications for Research

This paper is intended as a contribution toward filling a gap in our understanding of emerging collective bargaining relations in higher education. We have examined the perspectives of middle-level administrators, a group that has been largely neglected in this context.

At a broader level, our basic position is that theory in the area of university governance should be grounded in more general social theory, especially organization theory. With respect to the present topic, this implies the use of models and indicators derived from motivation theory. This position is consistent with that of Smart and

Marstain [13], who argue that a theory of job satisfaction and motivation within the academic community should be based on theoretical perspectives that cut across many types of organizations. Analysis of university governance has been unduly obstructed by the assumption that universities and their employees are singular phenomena like no other. The associated overemphasis on normative considerations has also retarded theory development.

The principal methodological implications of this position are that we need to specify explanatory models and to subject them to appropriately rigorous tests. The model derived within the present paper would appear to satisfy these criteria. At least within the present institutional context, it has considerable explanatory power. Simplistic methodologies provide inadequate tools for theory building. As shown above, they provide indications as to potential explanatory factors, but they can also lead to misleading interpretations. More sophisticated methods are required to identify underlying explanatory factors and to evaluate their relative significance. To know whether the model developed here is generalizable to middle-level administrators in other university systems requires replication of this study with samples of administrators across universities. Comparative studies would also permit incorporation of a variety of contextual factors not included here.

It would be very useful to have studies which compare perspectives of middle-level administrators with those of university chief executives. Although our review of published reports on perspectives of chief executives indicates that there are general similarities, data are not in a

form that facilitates systematic comparisons. The degree of congruity between the attitudes and expectations of these two groups of administrators would surely be an important factor in influencing the effectiveness of representation election strategies and institutional adaptation to collective bargaining. Further research is clearly warranted here. Such would also be true of administrator-faculty comparisons. Preliminary analysis of our CSUC data indicates wide discrepancies between these two groups with respect to both attitudes toward current conditions and expectations with regard to the impact of collective bargaining. Such differences would have major implications for the institutionalization of bargaining relationships. Comparative studies along these lines should be high on the agenda of researchers in higher education.

Finally, longitudinal studies are called for. Our CSUC study indicates a strong tendency for middle-level administrators to oppose the implementation of faculty bargaining in their own universities. They have deeply rooted unfavorable perceptions of the impact of collective bargaining. Such perceptions do not auger well for the quality of relations after collective bargaining is implemented. Longitudinal research would enable us to study the impact of bargaining on administrators, as well as processes of adaptation.

FOOTNOTES

[1]This paper is based upon research conducted within the Faculty Unionism Project at the Institute of Business and Economic Research, University of California, Berkeley. The project, funded by the Carnegie Corporation, is directed by Joseph W. Garbarino.

[2]Questionnaires were mailed in 1976 to campus administrators (below the campus president) employed in academic or academically related positions with managerial responsibilities. Usable responses numbering 247 were received, a response rate of about 45 percent. Department chairpersons were included in a related faculty survey but are excluded from the present analysis.

[3]Five principal faculty organizations are currently active in the CSUC: (1) the CSUC State Council of the California Conference of the American Association of University Professors; (2) the Association of California State University Professors, an independent group; (3) the California College and University Faculty Association, affiliated with the California Teachers Association, the state affiliate of the National Education Association; (4) the CSUC Academic Council of the California State Employees Association; and (5) the United Professors of California, affiliated with the California Federation of Teachers, the state affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO. The ACSUP has not endorsed collective bargaining. AAUP, CSEA, and CCUFA have formed a coalition, the Congress of Faculty Associations (CFA) for the primary purpose of defeating UPC in a representation election.

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TABLE 3A

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION WITH SUPPORT FOR BARGAINING FOR SYSTEM PERCEPTIONS AND GENERAL BARGAINING PERCEPTIONS VARIABLES (n = 250)

VARIABLE	MEAN	STD. DEV.	CORRELATION WITH SUPPORT FOR BARGAINING
I. Administrative Role:			
Dissatisfaction with upward influence	2.6	1.0	.25[a]
Dissatisfaction with support from higher administrators	2.3	1.1	.24[a]
Dissatisfaction with quality of decision relevant information	2.8	1.1	.09[c]
Perceived lack of campus autonomy	3.4	1.1	.07
Dissatisfaction with flexibility of rules in the CSUC	3.4	1.0	.07
Perceived inability to deal with long-run policy formation	4.0	.87	-.09[c]
Dissatisfaction with salary	2.9	1.1	.19[a]
II. Extent of Empathy with Faculty:			
Perceived senate effectiveness	2.6	1.0	-.05
Dissatisfaction with equity of faculty personnel decisions	2.5	1.0	.32[a]
- Perceived likelihood of most CSUC problems being solved without bargaining	3.6	.99	-.64[a]
III. Current Administration-Faculty Relations:			
Dissatisfaction with authority of administrators vis-a-vis faculty	2.7	.90	.15[a]
Extent to which faculty-administration relations are seen as cooperative vs. conflictive (dummy variable: 0=cooperative; 1=conflictive)	.40	.48	.06
Perceived lack of responsiveness by systemwide administration to faculty needs	3.5	.87	.24[a]
Perceived complexity of relationships in the CSUC	3.7	.82	.05

VARIABLE	MEAN	STD. DEV.	CORRELATION WITH SUPPORT FOR BARGAINING
IV. Institutional Characteristics			
Perceived excessive control of CSUC by state government	3.9	.90	-.09
Perceived inadequacy of resources relative to the University of California system	3.8	.97	-.04
Perceived lack of quality of CSUC educational program	2.7	1.1	.11[b]
Political Conservatism	2.6	.85	-.37[a]
Extent to which collective bargaining is perceived to be working well in higher education	2.2	.80	.49[a]
Extent to which faculty are perceived to understand the full implications of bargaining	1.9	.81	.41[a]

a=significant at .01 level
b=significant at .05 level
c=significant at .10 level

All items, except as noted, are responses to survey questions that employed a five category Likert type scale. For the "dissatisfaction" items, response categories were scored from "1" (very satisfied) to "5" (very dissatisfied), with "3" as the neutral value. For the perception items, response categories were scored from "1" (strongly disagree with indicated statement) to "5" (strongly agree with indicated statement), with "3" as the neutral value.

TABLE 3B

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND SIMPLE CORRELATION WITH SUPPORT FOR BARGAINING FOR EXPECTED OUTCOMES OF BARGAINING BY FACULTY ORGANIZATION (n = 250)

EXPECTED IMPACT	UPC			CFA		
	MEAN	SD	r*	MEAN	SD	r*
I. Administrative Role:						
Centralization of decision making from campus to system level	.74	.35	-.30[a]	.70	.38	-.24[a]
Centralization of decision making from intermediate to campus level	.73	.36	-.15[a]	.70	.36	-.21[a]
Increased power of nonacademic administrators	.90	.24	-.22[a]	.80	.30	-.22[a]
Decreased flexibility in decision making for administrators	.80	.36	-.29[a]	.71	.39	-.30[a]
II. Faculty Welfare:						
Increased equity of personnel decision	.31	.37	.43[a]	.43	.38	.39[a]
Decreased influence of faculty senates	.83	.33	-.16[a]	.68	.39	-.16[a]
III. Administration-Faculty Relations:						
Increased levels of conflict	.90	.25	-.16[a]	.60	.37	-.13[a]
Increased faculty power	.62	.41	.28[a]	.60	.39	.28[a]
Tougher stance by administrators in relations with faculty	.81	.32	-.19[a]	.70	.38	-.16[a]
Greater realism on part of faculty union leaders in dealing with administrators	.80	.36	.38[a]	.70	.39	.37[a]
IV. Insitutional Context:						
Increased resources to the CSUC	.34	.35	.46[a]	.40	.33	.40[a]
Lowered standards in promotion and tenure	.70	.37	-.35[a]	.45	.37	-.35[a]
Increased state government intervention into CSUC affairs	.80	.34	-.30[a]	.70	.36	-.32[a]

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EXPECTED IMPACT	UPC			CFA		
	MEAN	SD	r*	MEAN	SD	r*
Increased quality of educational programs	.20	.28	.48[a]	.30	.33	.38[a]
Increased influence of outside union or association leaders in CSUC affairs	.90	.27	-.32[a]	.60	.39	-.28[a]

a=significant at .01 level

*r=correlation (Pearson) between expectation and support for bargaining

Expected impact of bargaining under the UPC and the CFA scored along a three point scale for each of the two faculty organizations. The item was scored as "0" if the respondent did not expect the issue in question to occur, "1" if the respondent did expect the outcome, and "don't know" responses were scored as ".5."

TABLE 4

FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATOR EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE CSUC[a]

		FACTORS:[b]								
EXPECTATIONS:		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
1) Increased level of conflict under:	UPC		.62							
	CFA				.42					
2) Improvements in level of resources under:	UPC									.67
	CFA									.63
3) Lowered standards for faculty under:	UPC		.50	-.50						
	CFA			-.42						
4) Fairer treatment in faculty personnel decisions under	UPC			.66						
	CFA			.73	-.38					
5) Reduced role of senate under:	UPC	.62								
	CFA	.52			.37					
6) Inreased faculty power under:	UPC							.81		
	CFA							.76		
7) Increased intervention of state government under:	UPC	.59								
	CFA	.62			.36					
8) Centralization of decision making to statewide level under:	UPC						.42			
	CFA				.42		.43			
9) Improved quality of educational programs under:	UPC		-.52							
	CFA				-.57					

EXPECTATIONS:		FACTORS: I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
10) Increased influence in CUSC affairs by outside union leaders under:	UPC		.70							
	CFA				.55					
11) Increased power of nonacademic administrators under:	UPC		.69							
	CFA				.68					
12) Centralization of decision making from intermediate levels to campus level under:	UPC					.81				
	CFA					.74				
13) Tougher stance by administrators vis-a-vis faculty under:	UPC		.51							
	CFA				.58					
14) Greater pragmatism on part of faculty leaders under:	UPC								.78	
	CFA								.72	
15) Reduced administrator flexibility in decision making under:	UPC						.67			
	CFA						.77			
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY FACTOR:		.30	.08	.07	.05	.05	.04	.04	.04	.03

[a]Only factor loadings of greater than .35 or less than -.35 are reported. Only factors with an eigenvalue of greater than 1.0 were used. The final solution was obtained using quartimax rotation.

[b]See text for interpretation of factors.

TABLE 5

SUPPORT FOR BARGAINING REGRESSED AGAINST PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

Independent Variables:	EQ. 1 BETA	EQ.2 BETA	EQ.3 BETA
System Perceptions:			
Integration into the Hierarchy	-.21[a]	-.01	
Dissatisfaction with salary	.07	.05	
Perceived Administrative Responsiveness to Faculty Needs	-.26[a]	-.06	
Satisfaction with equity of Personnel Decisions	-.24[a]	-.07	
Satisfaction with Administration authority vis-a-vis faculty	-.08	.00	
Perceived Bureaucratization of System	-.11	-.01	
Political Conservativism		-.18[a]	-.19[a]
Extent to which Bargaining Working Well in Higher Education		.22[a]	.23[a]
Perceived Level of Understanding of Implications of Bargaining on Part of Faculty		.09[b]	.11[b]
Expected Effects of Bargaining:			
Collegiality (Factor I)		-.07	-.07
UPC Context (Factor II)		-.17[a]	-.18[a]
Treatment of Faculty (Factor III)		.21[a]	.23[a]
CFA Context (Factor IV)		-.14[a]	-.14[a]
Campus Centralization (Factor V)		.00	.00
Administrative Flexibility (Factor VI)		-.11[b]	-.11[b]
Faculty Power (Factor VII)		.11[b]	.16[a]
Pragmatism (Factor VII)		.10[b]	.11[b]
Resources (Factor IX)		.14[a]	.15[a]
F	8.6[a]	14[a]	20[a]
R^2	.19	.56	.54

a=significant at .01 level
b=significant at .05 level